What Aristotle attributes to Socrates

At Metaphysics 1078b, in his account of the origin of the theory of Forms (εἴδη, ἰδέαι), Aristotle names two things that may be credited to Socrates. The passage is given below in full, then the three terms it turns on (ἐπαγωγή, ὁρισμός, χωριστά), then the commentators in the corpus who glossed it.

The passage

δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν.

dýo gár estin há tis àn apodoíē Sōkrátei dikaíōs, toús t' epaktikoùs lógous kai tò horízesthai kathólou; tauta gár estin ámphō perì archḕn epistḗmēs; all' ho mèn Sōkrátēs tà kathólou ou chōristà epoíei oudè toùs horismoús; hoi d' echṓrisan, kai tà toiauta tōn óntōn idéas prosēgóreusan.

"For there are two things one might justly credit to Socrates: inductive arguments (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι) and defining universally (τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου). For both of these concern the starting-point of knowledge. But Socrates did not make the universals separate (χωριστά), nor the definitions; whereas they separated them, and called such beings Forms (ἰδέαι)."

(Aristotle, Metaphysics, Eulogikon: hgw-bj, ref. Metaph.1078b)

In the same sentence Aristotle names predecessors: Democritus, who touched the natural things and defined (ὡρίσατο) the hot and the cold "somewhat"; and the Pythagoreans, who earlier gave accounts of a few things (καιρός, the just, marriage) tied to numbers. He places Socrates' inquiry into the τί ἐστι (the "what-it-is") before the development of dialectic: διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ ἰσχὺς οὔπω τότ' ἦν, "for there was not yet dialectical strength" able to examine opposites apart from the what-it-is.

ἐπαγωγή

ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι is formed from ἐπαγωγή (epagōgḗ), from ἐπάγω, to lead or bring toward. Aristotle uses the term in the Topics:

διότι τῇ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ καθόλου ἀξιοῦμεν ἐπάγειν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐπάγειν μὴ εἰδότας τὰ ὅμοια.

dióti tē kath' hékasta epì tōn homoíōn epagōgē tò kathólou axioumen epágein; ou gàr rhāídión estin epágein mḕ eidótas tà hómoia.

"Because by the leading-toward (ἐπαγωγή) of the particular cases among similar things we claim to lead in (ἐπάγειν) the universal; for it is not easy to lead in [the universal] without knowing the similar cases."

(Aristotle, Topics, Eulogikon: hgw-cd, ref. Top.108b)

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states the relation of ἐπαγωγή to the universal and to demonstration:

ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου· εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα.

hē mèn dḕ epagōgḕ archḗ esti kai tou kathólou, ho dè syllogismòs ek tōn kathólou; eisìn ára archaì ex hōn ho syllogismós, hōn ouk ésti syllogismós; epagōgḕ ára.

"Leading-toward (ἐπαγωγή) is the starting-point of the universal as well, while deduction (συλλογισμός) proceeds from universals. There are, then, starting-points from which deduction proceeds, of which there is no deduction. So it is by leading-toward."

(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Eulogikon: hgw-aw, ref. EN 1139b)

ὁρισμός

τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου is formed from ὁρίζω (horízō), from ὅρος, a boundary-stone or limit. To ὁρίζεσθαι is to set a boundary, to delimit; a ὁρισμός is the bounded account of what a thing is. The two terms Aristotle credits to Socrates, ἐπαγωγή and ὁρισμός, both stand, in his phrase, περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης, about the starting-point of knowledge.

χωριστά

The distinction Aristotle draws between Socrates and the Platonists turns on χωριστά (chōristá), from χωρίζω, to separate, set apart. Socrates, he writes, did not make the universals χωριστά, separate; the Platonists ἐχώρισαν, separated them, and named the separated universals Forms. The passage continues with a consequence Aristotle draws from the separation:

ὥστε συνέβαινεν αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ πάντων ἰδέας εἶναι τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων, καὶ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἴοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη.

hṓste synébainen autois schedòn tō autō lógō pántōn idéas eînai tōn kathólou legoménōn, kai paraplḗsion hṓsper àn eí tis arithmēsai boulómenos elattónōn mèn óntōn oíoito mḕ dynḗsesthai, pleíō dè poiḗsas arithmoíē.

"So it came about for them that there were Forms of nearly everything spoken of universally, much as if someone wanting to count should think he could not when the things were fewer, but should count after making them more."

(Aristotle, Metaphysics, Eulogikon: hgw-bj, ref. Metaph.1078b)

The commentator: Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd c. CE)

Alexander, in his commentary on the Metaphysics, glosses Aristotle's remark about the absence of dialectic:

διὰ δὴ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἰσχὺν διαλεκτικῆς ἐζήτει πάντων ὁρισμοὺς λαμβάνειν.

dià dḕ tò mḕ eînai ischỳn dialektikēs ezḗtei pántōn horismoùs lambánein.

"Because the strength of dialectic did not exist, he sought to obtain definitions of everything."

(Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Eulogikon: reo-ae, ref. in Metaph 741)

At the preceding section Alexander glosses Aristotle's remark on the Pythagoreans, who (Aristotle wrote) defined a few things but did so without method. Alexander's word for the manner of their defining is μαλακῶς, softly or loosely (Eulogikon: in Metaph 740).

The biographical tradition: Diogenes Laertius (3rd c. CE)

Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Socrates, records the tradition that Socrates introduced ethics:

οὗτος καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν εἰσαγαγὼν

houtos kai tḕn ēthikḕn eisagagṑn

"He also introduced ethics."

(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers II, Eulogikon: rjo-ab, ref. Vit.2.16)

Aristotle writes that Socrates occupied himself περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, with the ethical excellences. Diogenes does not use Aristotle's terms ἐπαγωγή and ὁρισμός in this connection.